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brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in rnil3W-y doctrine and operationaf and organizationaf concepts,, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.'
Pundits and analysts overuse the term Revohfion in MXtaty Affa/rs. This essay seeks to draw dIstInctions among three fundamentally drfferent types of change In the nature of militarv affairs. Different dynamics imply different optimal responses to the challenge of change. To the extent that the term Revohtion in Mihtary Afiirscan be systematically disaggregated, a better understanding of ts resulting components may be possrble. This enhanced comprehension could lead to more efficient allocation of scarce resources-a critical consideration In a period of rapidly expanding scientific and technical knowledge, uncertainty about national security threats, tight fiscal constraints and great enthusiasm In some circles for /nformafion wa/fae.'
Rapid advances In sclentrfic knowledge and technological capablhtles have over the past century Injected unprecedented dynamism into development of armaments, creating considerable ferment In military doctrine and organizational concepts as well.
Efforts to analvze these phenomena and offer appropriate courses of action to national security planners spawned such terms as Mditaary-Technical Revolutions (MTRs) and
Revolutions in Mihtary Affairs (RMAs). Revolutton IS a heavily loaded word, implying a malor upheaval and a dismantling of existing order. Analysts attempting to convince policymakers of the need to redirect resources, change doctrine or alter force structures ' Sctence Applications InternatIonal (1996) , httw//sac saic com/rmaoaoer htm "The Revolution In Mllltaty Affairs," p. What occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentallv alters the character and conduct of conflict4
Krepinevich goes on to stress that the impact of this synergistic change generates a substantiaI-"often an order of magnitude or greater"-increase in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces. In concrete terms, that means that a unit (e.g., ship or infantry regiment) that has benefited from a RMA should be ten times as capable as a similar unit which has not experienced the revolution. In concrete terms, a post-revolutionary ship should be able to defeat ten pre-revolutionarv vessels. These huge gun platforms essentially symbolized naval establishments desires to do what they had always done, but with more speed and firepower.
What fundamentally changed naval doctrine was the Introduction first of large numbers of submarines (1915-19lS) , and then development of carrier-based aviation or risk having his navy annihilated by warplanes whose base (a carrier) his battleships'
7 Battle zones drd become larger as guns' range and accuracy Improved, and the ships themselves were much better armored and faster than were 15?" century wooden-hulled men-of-war, but the changes in doctnne and tacbcs were fundamentally evolutronary rather than revolutronary * Battleships were hugely expensrve and intended pnmanly to sink other battleshrps, so that cruisers and destroyers could hunt down smaller warships and merchantmen wrthout fear of 16-Inch guns But the battleshrp was vulnerable to the far less expensive submarine, and submariners' success against capital ships called Into questron long-established cost/benefti calculabons that supported burldrng big ships.
guns could not reach. Today, the commander of a U.S. carrier battle group IS usually someone who was onginallv trained as an aircraft pilot, and ballistic missile submarines can devastate targets thousands of miles away and far inland. In short, the submarine and the airplane in under three generations more fundamentally changed character and conduct of war, especially naval war, than did the SO-year evolution of the battleship.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that advances in naval architecture flowing from the battleship race made the aircraft carrier possible and that many technological developments of the lgth century underlay the creation of the seagoing submarine. In an important sense, each RMA builds on those which preceded it, and none-even the most profound-is entirely independent of the broad lines of military history.
No RMA in history was more profound and none ever happened so rapidly as the Nuclear Revolution. Its impact was not limited to an explosion almost four orders of magnitude greater than anything the world had ever seen. The Bomb changed not Just the character and conduct of war but also affected its nature by substantially altering the degree of risk a state faced when warring with a nuclear power. Much effort had to go into avoiding an escalation of conflict to levels where nuclear weapons might be employed. The indirect method became critical to pursuing national interests, as the principal nuclear antagonists (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) engaged in a Cold War designed to wear each another down and to lure each other into costly military adventures without risking all-out (nuclear) war. The Clausewitzian approach of mass on mass remained
Intact on one level (geostrategic theory) in the concepts of deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction. But, the two superpowers had to turn to Sun Tzu for guidance on how to advance their respective national interests without being utterlv annihilated in the process.g Their respective allies had to think in similar terms, a mayor departure --from the direct approach that had until then prevailed In Western strategic thinking. Ironically, the overwhelming U.S. lead in information technologies discourages the kind of risk-taking needed to expand that lead. Policymakers' recognize that a steadv flow of resources into information technology will, for now, maintain the U.S. lead, and they fear that direction of resources to visionary or speculative prolects might produce no useful result and consequently considerable political embarrassment.14 Another small sign that a Type Three RMA may be before us IS the relative computer poverty of the National War College. If information technology is to be exploited fully within the Armed Forces, the future top leadership of the Services should be integrating computer technology into their work environment more fully and more creabvelv than IS possible given present resources. However, the American entrepreneurial system offers hope for a RMA more profound, rapid and far-reaching than a Type Three would offer.
l3 One possible area for such a breakthrough might be virtual real@, but the known laws of phystcs and slow development of robotics technologies cast doubts. The 1977 short story, "Ender's Game," later published In novel form as Ender3 War(Orson Scott Card, New York. T. Doherty Assoc., 19S5) tells the story of a young tactical genius who, thrnkmg he IS playing a tralnlng slmulatlon, IS actually guiding the human fleet against its interstellar enemy through use of a communications device (anslble) which transcends light speed In achieving what he thinks IS an imaginary v~ctoty, young Andrew ("Ender") WIggIn goes beyond the rules of clvlllzed conflict and gives new meaning to the term "total war W I4 "Bureaucrats everywhere Judge themselves by their efforts to gain prestige or power for their InsMuttons Unless changes could conceivably bring further advantage to their own bureaus, bureaucrats will endeavor to work for the status quo." Karel van Wolferen In fbrelgn Affa/is(Sept/Oct 1993), p 57.
S
Even If the mrlrtary IS bureaucratically rnclrned to avoid risk and protect exrsbng rnstrtutrons, the private sector wrll continue to develop cutting-edge technologres for non-mrlrtary use. Synergies between non-mrlrtarv and mrlrtary information technology applications are apparent,15 and feedback through companres' research and development operations provide mvnad opportunrbes for conceptualization and Innovation outside of the "box" of current acqursrtron and development requirements
The moment that defines a RMA is when planners go beyond using a new technology to accomplish longstanding tasks more effectively (e.g., using tanks to break holes In Infantry lines) and start applying the new technology In entirely new ways (e.g., using tanks to spearhead offensives and then attack the enemy's rear areas to create circumstances favorable to a battle of encirclement). We are more conscrous today than ever before of the importance of RMAs. A Type One or Type Two RMA generated by another power could upset the mrlrtary status quo, with profound implrcatrons for U.S. national security. An open and vigorous debate on how best to proceed In the development and deployment of mrlrtary information technologres remains critical to finding the optimal mix of Innovation and cost-effectiveness?
Openness to new Ideas will always be essential, but we must not allow vrslon to outpace understanding. The world of military affairs IS, ultimately, a supremely practical one with potentially terrible consequences for those who make mistakes. I5 The software for many mllltary InformatIon technology systems IS often taken "off the shelf," with only the systems lntegratron component unique to the mlktary user l6 Mazarr, op.&, offers many thoughts on this SubJect, Including speclflc recommendations on rethlnkmg organlzabons and conducbng misstons reviews. Theodor Galdi examines lndlvldual planning and doctrine documents In "Revolution in M111tat-y Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational Responses, OutstandIng Issues (Washington: Congressional Research Setvtce, 19S5, Publication 95-1170 F) Theodor Galdi" proposes an Office of the Devil's Advocate for RMA Issues for lust that purpose-"to serve as a counterbalance to the wishes of service leaders and assessments by advocates." While Galdi's Idea has merit, such an office would also have to be able to advocate well-founded new ideas and concepts. Giving rt Galdi's restricted role likely would only deepen bureaucratic consewabsm at a time when the order of the dav should be critical openness.18
As visionaries and planners look for wavs to bring the U.S. military more rapidly into the Information Age, attention must be paid to potential U.S. vulnerabilitres. As the premier user of information technologies and the state most dependent upon them, the U.S. IS uniquely vulnerable to attacks by other states and by non-state actors, working on their own or with the support of antagonistic but not overtly hostile states.lg U.S. financial centers and, by extension, the economy, could suffer particularly acute and systemic damage from a well-formulated, well-executed attack on computer systems. Moreover, information warfare will not work against an enemy who IS not dependent upon information technology. An analogv to attempts during the Korean War to cut Chinese supply lines with strategic bombing, even though much of the mater&l was being carried on soldiers' backs, is instructive. Wiping out an enemy's Internet communications will not matter much if the enemy IS accustomed to using hard-copy marl or other communications systems not dependent upon computers that the U.S. l7 Ibid., p 27 '* By cni~wlopennes.., I mean being open to but not bedazzled by new Ideas-a wllkngness to test novel concepts rigorously but wtihout preludice lg Matthew G. Devost, et.al., "Informabon Terrorism: Can You Trust Your Toaster," in Robert E Nerlson, ed , op at, pp 63-67, posits a Serbian irredenbst group's use of computer sabotage to cause Amencan mlktary atrcraft to crash and to bring down U.S. computer systems, prompting a U.S. wlthdrawal from peacekeeping In 6osnra 10 might be able to disrupt. A similar caution IS In order with respect to precision strike technologies. These weapons tend to be very expensive, so an enemv who could break down important targets into relatively cheap smaller targets with significant operational redundancy might be able to force the U.S. to expend huge resources for minor gains.
Rnallv, we do not know what information war ultimately will look like. Some argue that the battlefield of the mature Informatron Age will be "a Joint kllllng field, virtually impenetrable to the other except at very high cost," thus suggesting wars of stalemate similar to World War One.*' Such an outcome could be consistent with a Type Two or a Tvpe Three RMA. Others, much more visionary, have gone so far as to paint a portrait of war conducted by attacking the enemy's information systems and, by implication, his economy, thereby sapping his will to fight without firing a shot (or at least not many shots). Sun Tzu*' would have approved. This concept IS, of course, the premise of Devost and hrs co-authors (Note 19). If brought to fruition It could be a Type One RMA, since It would imply a mayor change In the nature of war away from significant physical violence and toward destruction of intangible assets, such as databases and software.
Again, there needs to be an understanding that the U.S. IS, at present, much more vulnerable to attacks of this nature than are most potential enemies. Moreover, history offers us no particular reason to believe that a state-even a computer systemsdependent U.S.-would respond to a concerted attack against its economy by suing for peace. Far more llkelv would be retaliation against the enemy by use of traditional means of violence. It IS noteworthy that Devost's scenario involved an area (Bosnia) 11 not of vital Interest to the U.S. However, no matter how unlikely we consider such a Type One RMA, the potential implications for the U.S. are awesome, so assignment of appropriate resources to remaining abreast of developments and possible challenges in this area would be money well spent. As the world's premier status quo power, the U.S. cannot afford to let another state (or non-state actor) steal the march.
2o Martin Llblckt, 'SIllcon and Secunty In the Twenty-First Century," quoted In Mazarr, op, cft., p.42. 21 "To subdue the enemy without fighting IS the acme of sktll." Sun Tzu, op.ck, p. 77
